Selfish Load Balancing Under Partial Knowledge 1st Edition by Elias Koutsoupias, Panagiota N Panagopoulou, Paul Spirakis – Ebook PDF Instant Download/Delivery. 9783540744566
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ISBN 10:
ISBN 13: 9783540744566
Author: Elias Koutsoupias, Panagiota N Panagopoulou, Paul Spirakis
We consider n selfish agents or players, each having a load, who want to place their loads to one of two bins. The agents have an incomplete picture of the world: They know some loads exactly and only a probability distribution for the rest. We study Nash equilibria for this model, we compute the Price of Anarchy for some cases and show that sometimes extra information adversely affects the Divergence Ratio (a kind of subjective Price of Anarchy).
Selfish Load Balancing Under Partial Knowledge 1st Table of contents:
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Model and Results
1.2 Motivation and Related Work
1.3 Organization
2. PRELIMINARIES
3. BOUNDSONTHE PRICE OF ANARCHY
3.1 An Improved Upper Bound forEqualSpeed Servers
3.2 A Lower Bound
4. PRICE OF ANARCHY IN LPNORM
5. ANALYSIS OF GREEDY
5.1 An Improved Bound forEqual SpeedServers
5.2 Some lower bounds
6. CLOSING REMARKS
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