Cyber security of SCADA and Other Industrial Control Systems 1st Edition by Edward Colbert, Alexander Kott ISBN 9783319321257 3319321250

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ISBN 10: 3319321250
ISBN 13: 9783319321257
Author: Edward Colbert, Alexander Kott

Cyber security of SCADA and Other Industrial Control Systems 1st Edition Table of contents:

Chapter 1: Introduction and Preview

1.1 The Structure and Functions of an ICS

1.1.1 Key Segments of an ICS

1.1.2 Safety and Reliability in ICS

1.1.3 Security of ICS Field Network Components

1.2 Preview of this Book

References

Chapter 2: Components of Industrial Control Systems

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Industrial Control System Functional Components

2.2.1 Programmable Logic Controller

2.2.2 Remote Terminal Unit

2.2.3 Intelligent Electronic Device

2.2.4 Engineering Workstation

2.2.5 Human Machine Interface

2.2.6 Data Historian

2.2.7 Communications Gateways

2.2.8 Front End Processor

2.2.9 ICS Field Devices

2.3 Types of ICS

2.3.1 Process Control System

2.3.2 Safety Instrumented System

2.3.3 Distributed Control System

2.3.4 Building Automation System

2.3.5 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

2.3.6 Energy Management System

2.3.7 Other Type of ICSs

References

Chapter 3: Wireless Infrastructure in Industrial Control Systems

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Wireless Technologies for ICSs

3.2.1 WirelessHART

3.2.2 ISA 100.11a Standard

3.2.3 Z-Wave

3.2.4 Zigbee

3.2.5 Bluetooth

3.2.6 Microwave

3.2.7 Satellite

3.3 Cyber and Physical Threats to Wireless ICSs

3.3.1 Generic Threat Model

3.3.2 Specific Threats for Wireless ICS Technologies

3.3.3 Desired Security Mechanisms

3.3.4 Additional Security Mechanisms

3.4 Integration of Wireless Technologies to an Existing ICS Infrastructure: Smart Grid and Micro

3.4.1 FIU Smart Grid Testbed

3.4.2 Test Case: Handling Islanding Situation via Wireless Communication

3.5 Summary and Conclusions

References

Chapter 4: Operational Technology and Information Technology in Industrial Control Systems

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Difference Between IT and OT

4.2.1 Operational

4.2.1.1 Operational Objectives

Safety

Environmental

Societal Dependencies

Physical Infrastructure

4.2.1.2 High Availability Requirements

4.2.1.3 Geographic Location

4.2.2 Technological

4.2.2.1 Limited Support for Security Mechanisms

4.2.2.2 Embedded Systems

4.2.2.3 Network Protocols

4.2.2.4 Real-Time Performance

4.2.2.5 Legacy and Esoteric Technologies

4.2.2.6 Cyber-Physical Risk Analysis

4.2.3 Managerial

4.2.3.1 Long Lifecycle

4.2.3.2 Financial Investments

4.2.3.3 Vendors & Procurement

4.2.3.4 Managerial Domains

4.3 Convergence of IT Technologies into ICSs

4.3.1 Mobile Computing

4.3.2 Cloud Computing

4.3.3 Internet of Things and Smart Cities

4.4 Summary and Conclusions

References

Chapter 5: Threats in Industrial Control Systems

5.1 Introduction

5.2 The ICS Threat Landscape: A Paradigm Shifted

5.3 Organizational Threats

5.3.1 The Executive Level

5.3.2 The Chief Information Security Officer

5.3.3 Cultural Differences

5.3.4 Education and Training

5.3.5 Depreciation Cycle

5.3.6 ICT Security Standards

5.3.7 Procurement

5.4 Architecture and Technology Threats

5.4.1 Old Technology

5.4.2 Insecurity by Design

5.4.3 New functionality for Old Packaging

5.4.4 Protocols

5.5 Networking and Telecommunications

5.5.1 Operational Environment

5.5.2 Remote Network Access

5.5.3 Dependencies of ICT Systems

5.5.4 Direct Connection to the Internet

5.6 Human Factors

5.6.1 User Awareness

5.6.2 Policies and Procedures

5.6.3 Disgruntled Employees

5.7 Operations and maintenance of ICS

5.7.1 Passwords

5.7.2 Who Is “Empowered”?

5.7.3 Change Management

5.7.4 Patching

5.7.5 Malware Protection

5.7.6 Hardware Access and Networking

5.8 The ICS Environment

5.8.1 Physical Security

5.8.2 Dependencies

5.8.3 Third Parties on Site

5.8.4 Remote Access

5.9 Summary and Conclusions

References

Chapter 6: Attacks on Industrial Control Systems

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Overview

6.2.1 Known Attacks

6.2.2 General Attack Methods

6.2.3 Rootkits

6.2.4 Example Notional System

6.2.5 Capture the Flag and ICS-CERT

6.3 Stuxnet Attack

6.3.1 Background

6.3.2 Deployment and Propagation

6.3.3 Effects

6.4 Summary and Conclusions

References

Chapter 7: Security Taxonomies of Industrial Control Systems

7.1 Introduction

7.2 Overview

7.2.1 Taxonomy Examples

7.2.2 Vulnerability Taxonomies

7.2.3 Attack Taxonomies

7.2.3.1 Attack-Vulnerability-Damage Model (Fleury et al. 2008)

7.2.3.2 A Taxonomy of Targeted Attack (Line et al. 2014)

7.2.3.3 Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems (Zhu et al 2011)

7.2.4 Comparison of Taxonomy Area of Interest

7.3 Emerging Developments and Research

7.3.1 A Proposed Taxonomy for Vulnerabilities

7.3.2 Ontological Approaches to SCADA Vulnerabilities or Attacks

7.3.3 Cyber Attacker Taxonomy

7.3.3.1 Incident-Based Matrix

7.4 Future Developments and Directions

7.5 Summary and Conclusions

References

Chapter 8: Cyber Risk in Industrial Control Systems

8.1 Introduction

8.2 Approaches to Risk Modeling and Analysis

8.2.1 Expert Elicited Models

8.2.2 Attack Graphs

8.2.3 Games

8.2.4 Petri Nets

8.2.5 Stochastic Cyber Attack Models with Petri Nets

8.3 Petri Nets for Control Systems

8.3.1 Attack Model

8.3.2 Computing State Reachability

8.3.3 Reachability under Monotonicity

8.3.4 Measuring Risk

8.3.5 Backtracking for Risk Management Planning

8.4 An Example Petri Net Analysis of a Control System

8.5 Summary and Conclusions

References

Chapter 9: Security Metrics in Industrial Control Systems

9.1 Introduction

9.2 Motivation

9.3 Background on Resilience Metrics

9.3.1 What Makes a Good Metric?

9.3.2 Metrics for IT Systems

9.3.3 Metrics for ICS Networks

9.4 Approaches for ICS Metrics

9.4.1 Cyber Resilience Matrix Example

9.4.2 Network Simulation Example

9.5 Tips for Generating Metrics

9.5.1 Generalized Metric Development Process

9.5.2 Best Practices in Metric Development and Validation

9.6 Summary and Conclusions

References

Chapter 10: Situational Awareness in Industrial Control Systems

10.1 Introduction

10.2 Cyber-Physical Systems are Complex

10.3 SA as a Human-driven Process

10.4 Cyber Kill Chain: Adversarial Reasoning

10.5 Stuxnet Through the Cyber Kill Chain: An ICS Example

10.5.1 Phase 1: Recon and Probing—Stuxnet Development

10.5.2 Phase 2: Stuxnet Delivery

10.5.3 Phase 3: Exploiting SCADA Systems

10.5.4 Phases 4 and 5: Stuxnet’s Foothold and Control

10.5.5 Phase 6: Stuxnet in Action

10.6 Guidelines

10.6.1 Expertise of the Operator(s) Responsible for Developing SA

10.6.2 Sensors and Data

10.6.3 System Documentation, Assessment, and “Blue Teaming”

10.6.4 Automation

10.6.5 Limiting Human Actions and Physical Parameter Controls

10.7 Summary and Conclusions

References

Chapter 11: Intrusion Detection in Industrial Control Systems

11.1 Introduction

11.2 Background

11.2.1 Motivation for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) in Industrial Control Systems (ICSs)

11.2.2 Early Intrusion Detection Systems

11.2.3 Evolution from Early to Modern IDSs

11.3 Modern Intrusion Detection Techniques

11.3.1 Host-Based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS)

11.3.2 Network-Based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS)

11.3.2.1 Signature-Based Intrusion Detection Methods

11.3.2.2 Non-signature-Based Intrusion Detection Methods

11.3.2.3 Methods Used in Practice

11.4 Intrusion Detection in ICSs

11.4.1 Anatomy of An Industrial Control System

11.4.2 Host-Based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS) in ICSs

11.4.3 Network-Based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) in ICSs

11.4.3.1 Signature-Based Intrusion Detection Methods in ICSs

11.4.3.2 Non-Signature-Based Intrusion Detection Methods in ICSs

Early Examples (Before 2010)

Recent Examples (2010 or After)

11.5 Process-Oriented Intrusion Detection

11.5.1 Overview

11.5.1.1 Semantic Security Modeling from Network Traffic Data

11.5.1.2 ARL Collaborative Modeling using SME Input, Network Traffic Data, and Process Monitoring D

11.5.2 ARL Collaborative Intrusion Detection: A Case Study of a Sample Plant

11.5.2.1 Background: Description of a Plant

Physical Plant Model

Implementation: Electronic Plant Model

Plant Control Network

Human Machine Interface (HMI)

PLC/Regulator (PID Controller)

Network Traffic Monitor

Independent High-Speed Sensor

11.5.2.2 Configuration of Plan Security Monitoring Model

Inference of Critical Values from Network Traffic Data

Determination of Critical Values from SME Input and Network Traffic Data

Model Refinement and Verification using Network Traffic Data

Model Refinement and Verification using Out-of-Band Data (High speed sensor)

11.5.2.3 Intrusion Detection Alerting

11.6 Summary and Conclusions

References

Chapter 12: Cyber Physical Intrusion Detection

12.1 Introduction

12.2 Leveraging Physical Monitoring in ICS Cybersecurity

12.3 Example—SCADA Cybersecurity Monitoring Using Power Fingerprinting

12.3.1 Monitoring Physical Side-Channels to Detect Malicious Intrusions and Unauthorized Execution

12.3.2 Integrity Assessment and Intrusion Detection

12.3.3 Characterization

12.3.4 PFP Advantages and Limitations

12.4 Case Study: Siemens S7-1200 Monitoring

12.4.1 The System

12.4.2 Baseline Reference Extraction

12.4.3 Detection Performance

12.5 Future Developments

12.6 Summary and Conclusions

References

Chapter 13: Experimental Methods for Control System Security Research

13.1 Introduction

13.2 Overview of the Approaches

13.2.1 Live, Virtual, Constructive

13.2.1.1 Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS)

13.2.1.2 Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resiliency Simulator (CIPR/sim)

13.2.2 The Need for Cyber Analysis

13.2.2.1 Threat Analysis

13.2.2.2 LVC Supports Cyber Fidelity Requirements

13.2.2.3 Advanced Modeling Support for SCADA and ICS Applications

13.2.3 Modeling Methodology Applied to Industrial Control and SCADA Systems

13.2.3.1 Obtaining Modeled System Specification

13.3 Modeling Industrial Control and SCADA Systems Using Hybrid Testbed

13.3.1 Simulated and Emulated Devices Used in the Hybrid Testbed Experiment

13.3.1.1 Device Model: Simulated

13.3.1.2 Device Model: Emulated

13.3.1.3 Device Model: Physical

13.3.2 Industrial Control and SCADA Systems Security Assessment Demonstration Experiment and Setup

13.3.2.1 Global Internet-like System

13.3.2.2 Enterprise Networked Information Systems

13.3.2.3 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) System

13.3.2.4 Models, Simulations, and Emulations Used in Demonstration Experiment

Device Representations

Application and Traffic Representations

13.3.3 Industrial Control and SCADA Systems Security Assessment Demonstration Experiment—Security

13.3.3.1 Analysis of Cyber-Attacks Targeting the Business Network

13.3.3.2 Analysis of Cyber-Attacks Against the Control System Network

13.3.4 Data Collection and Analytics in Hybrid Testbed Experiments

13.4 Summary and Conclusions

References

Chapter 14: Governance and Assessment Strategies for Industrial Control Systems

14.1 Introduction

14.2 Overview

14.2.1 A Motivating Story

14.2.2 Some Definitions

14.2.3 Purpose of Governance

14.2.4 Groups Issuing ICS Governance

14.2.5 ICS Assessments

14.3 Examples of ICS Assessment Processes

14.3.1 NIST Cybersecurity Framework

14.3.2 Department of Energy (DoE) and DHS Cyber Capability Maturity Model (C2M2)

14.3.3 Robust ICS Planning & Evaluation (RIPE) Framework

14.3.4 DHS ICS Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT) Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET)

14.3.5 Overview of Assessment Methodologies

14.4 Summary and Conclusions

References

Chapter 15: Responding to Attacks on Industrial Control Systems and SCADA Systems

15.1 Introduction

15.2 Cyber Warfare

15.2.1 Jus ad bellum (“Right to War”)

15.2.2 Use of Force

15.2.3 Schmitt Analytical Framework

15.2.4 Mitigation and Response

15.3 Case Study Analyses for Use of Force

15.3.1 China Case Study

15.3.2 Iran Case Study

15.3.3 Havex Case Study

15.4 Summary and Conclusions

References

Chapter 16: In Conclusion: The Future Internet of Things and Security of Its Control Systems

16.1 Introduction

16.2 Overview of Change in Control Systems

16.2.1 Industrial Revolution: Earliest Times to the Present

16.2.2 Sustainability of an Industrial Enterprise

16.2.2.1 Economic Factors

16.2.2.2 Environmental Factors

16.2.2.3 Social Factors

16.2.2.4 The Future

16.2.3 The Internet of Things (IoT)

16.2.3.1 Global Development of the IIoT

16.2.3.2 Expected Impact

16.3 Game Changers in the Future ICS and IoT Security

16.3.1 Construction of the Future IoT

16.3.1.1 Devices

Miniaturization of End Devices and Sensors

Mobility and Wearable Devices

16.3.1.2 Materials and Material Processes

Advances in Materials

3D Manufacturing

16.3.1.3 Automation and Robotics

Automation and Artificial Intelligence

Robotics

Nanobots

16.3.1.4 Software

Software and Applications

16.3.2 Users of the Future IoT

16.3.2.1 Industrial Plant Users

Plant Control Methods

Data Transfer Media in Plants

Smart Sensors

The Network Layer

16.3.2.2 Consumers

16.3.3 Support for the Future IoT

16.3.3.1 Computing and Infrastructure

Industrial Control Efficiency

Networks and Infrastructure

New Territories for Network Complexity

Computing and Cloud Services

New Computing Paradigms

16.3.3.2 Government and Industry Guidance and Collaboration

16.4 Predictions and Potential Solutions

16.4.1 Resilient Self-Adaption

16.4.2 Mixed-Trust Systems

16.4.3 Big Data Analytics

16.4.4 Proactive Threat Responsiveness

16.5 Summary and Conclusions

References

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